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Strategic Rifleman: Key to More Moral Warfare

Strategic Riflemen

Synopsis

America's military power has been largely one dimensional in an increasingly multi-dimensional arena. Standoff bombardment has little effect on a widely dispersed and loosely controlled foe. That takes tiny ground elements with enough tactical ability to operate beyond any firepower umbrella. No more than 14 people can totally surprise an enemy unit. That's why other nations use squads as the spearpoints for every attack and strongpoints of every defense. Through an over-emphasis on firepower, U.S. forces have never developed this capability. Better squads require more skilled members. Such members can often make a strategic difference on their own and require less force after surprising defenders. This book uses 173 illustrations to show how to become/produce a “strategic” rifleman. It's for survival-oriented recruits and anyone wanting to know how the Pentagon could project more overseas power with less funding.

What the critics have said about Strategic Rifleman:

“Whoever occupies contested ground ends up winning the war, not the one flying remotely overhead,” says . . . [the author[ of “Strategic Rifleman.” It’s unrealistic, . . . to think that the U.S. can win any part of another world war by repeating its strategy in Serbia or Libya. “It must instead have a ground presence in every contested region. Yet that presence need not be a massive expeditionary force, only tiny increments of indigenous force multipliers.”          
            — Aviation Week, 24 March 2015

"Standoff bombardment has little effect on a loosely controlled foe. That takes tiny ground elements skilled enough to operate beyond any firepower umbrella."
            - "Military Officer Magazine," January 2015  

“Small semi-autonomous units . . . appear to be the only way to counter our most recent enemies.  This book shows how to produce riflemen and commandos skilled enough to survive beyond any firepower umbrella.”
            — National Museum of the Marine Corps, October 2014

"Innovative Product—[In] Strategic Rifleman . . .  Poole advocates a lighter, more agile, initiative-driven force that is capable of handling the adversaries our current force has had such challenges with."
            — "The Counter Terrorist," August/September 2014

“Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Michael Mullen [said] . . . debt was America’s greatest vulnerability. . . . [Our] government will have to drastically reduce spending or face creditors unwilling to continue lending.  America’s defense apparatus . . . [needs] a more cost-effective model. . . . Read Strategic Rifleman and see how austerity could actually be used to improve the U.S. military’s capabilities.”
        — Chris Graham, editor of The Counter Terrorist
       founding member of USMC Anti-Terrorism Battalion

“Organization, configuration, and commitment of a nation’s armed forces are . . . important. . . . Exceedingly more important is the tactical prowess and strategic potency of the individual combatant, the lone rifleman in the mud and blood of battle. . . . [This] concept is nothing new, but . . . Poole presents its importance with unique insight. . . . The skill and will of individual combatants are the . . . cornerstones upon which a nation’s interests and security depend.  Strategic Rifleman describes why and how to create [such] forces for the future.”
        — Maj.Gen. John H. Admire USMC (Ret.)
       former commander of 1st Marine Division

“Since World War II, the United States has fought five major wars resulting in a stalemate in Korea, a defeat in Vietnam, . . . a prolonged stalemate in the second Iraq war, and a thirteen-year stalemate/potential defeat in Afghanistan.  Surely U.S. doctrine, since 1951, combined with its idolatry belief in technology is NOT the answer.  John Poole, in this, his latest volume on the wars of the 21st century, has given the American military the opportunity to seize victory from the jaws of outdated doctrine and a future prolonged stalemate.
         — Kim Holien (U.S. Army civilian historian for 35 years) 

“‘There is a gap between the . . . [skill of our special-operations units] and the high-tech capabilities we are developing.  That gap has grown larger as we refuse to invest in our ground forces and make them more capable to meet the demands of today’s battlefield.  John Poole offers a unique and creative solution to fill that gap in
Strategic Rifleman.”
         —Gen. Anthony C. Zinni USMC (Ret.) former Head of CENTCOM


Table of Contents:

List of Illustrations                                
Tables                                  
Foreword                                  
Preface                                                
Acknowledgments                                  
Part One:  The Supernatural Legacy of Armed Conflict 
     Chapter 1:  Evil Has Long Influenced War                    
     Chapter 2:  Mystical Tricks of a More Worldly Origin

Part Two:  Modern Wars Spill Over into Spiritual Arena
     Chapter 3:  Overwhelming Force No Longer the Answer           
     Chapter 4:  Enhancement of Local Security More Vital

Part Three:  America Needs Self-Regulating Squads
     Chapter 5:  The Pentagon’s New Worldwide Strategy 
     Chapter 6:  How Best to Train Local Security Forces           
     Chapter 7:  Light Infantrymen Need No Technology           
     Chapter 8:  Taking Strongpoints without Bombardment           
     Chapter 9:  Monitoring a Large Area with Few U.S. Forces    
     Chaptr 10:  New Doctrine Calls for More Squad Autonomy 

Part Four:  Such Squads Take Raider-Like Training
     Chapter 11:  Riflemen Need More Than Rules of Engagement
     Chapter 12:  Creating a More Proactive Fighter    
     Chapter 13:  What Such Riflemen Add to Unit Power

Part Five:  Properly Preparing the New Squad Member
     Chapter 14:  All-Hands Accountability for More Moral Units     
     Chaper 15:  Reestablishing Individual Initiative         
     Chapter 16:  Personal-Decision-Making Practice       
     Chapter 17:  Troops Must Help to Design Own Moves

Afterword:  No Minor Oversight                   
Appendix:  Korean War Sighting                   
Notes
     Source Notes                                  
     Endnotes                             
Glossary                                  
Bibliography                                  
About the Author         
Name Index


ISBN 9780981865959

 

Paperback: 320 pages, 173 illustrations